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INTRODUCTION
This paper is an attempt to study the Korean eco
nomic problems, and to describe and evaluate the various
forms of foreign economic aid to Korea during the period
1945-1955.
Korea was reborn in 1945, but as two Koreas on the
tiny peninsula.

No communication has been exchanged be

tween the two parts since 194#.

Thus, in this paper "Korea”

refers only to the southern part except in the historical
portions and where otherwise evident.
Korea had by 1955 been the recipient of approximate1
ly $1,436 million of foreign aid under the various names5
the Government and Relief in Occupation Areas of the United
States Army (1945-1949)* the Economic Cooperation Adminis
tration (1949-1951), the Foreign Operation Administration
(1951-1953), the Civil Relief in Korea (1950 —

), the

United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (1952

), and

the International Cooperation Administration (1953 --- )«
In addition, Korea has received annual military assistance
of more than $300 million through the Korean-American Mutual

1
The Bank of Korea, Annual Economic Review, 1957,
(Korea: The Research Department, Bank of Korea, 1957),
IV, 221.
1

Defense Agreement of 1950,

2
2

and Agricultural surplus aid

by United States Public Law 480 of 1954*

Ninety percent

of the total aid received by Korea has come from the United
3
States*
The entire question of foreign economic aid, however,
is extremely complex because it involves nationalist aspira
tions and international relations as well.

For this reason,

a brief economic history of Korea since annexation by Japan
in 1910, including a summary of important political develop
ments leading to the establishment of a divided Korea, is
presented in Chapter I.

This furnishes a background for

understanding the current economic problems of Korea.

In

Chapter II, a more detailed treatment of the economic pro
blems of Korea since the end of World War II is given.
Chapter III is a discussion of specific measures of foreign
aid to Korea during the period, 1945-1955o

Finally, an

evaluation of past foreign economic aid with suggestions
for future foreign aid and its effective utilization, are
presented in the concluding chapter.

2
Ibid., I, 181.
3
Ibid., I, 182.

CHAPTER I
THE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF KOREA
A.

THE KOREAN ECONOMY, 1910-1945

Characteristics of the Economy,,

The Korean economy

has, as yet, nothing to distinguish it from that of any
other typical Asian country.

First, the economy has been

predominantly agricultural.

The farming population was
1
73.6 percent of the total population in 193 3®
Second,
such basic industrial resources as coal, iron ore, and

hydroelectric potential have not yet been developed on a
large scale.

This has effected a low productivity in agri

culture due to adherence to traditional methods.

Third,

the pressure of population on resources has become evident
and made for poverty.

Furthermore, thirty-six years of

Japanese colonial rule were, in some important respects,
detrimental to Korean economic development.
Korea has an homogeneous population of over 30 million
and is located between the Chinese mainland and the Japanese
islands.

It is separated from Manchuria by the Yalu and

Grajdanzen, Andrew J., Modern Korea, (N.Y.:
John Day Company, 1944). p. 79®
3

The

4
Tumang rivers and adjoins Russian territory along a twelvemile length*

The rest of the land is stretched out between

the Yellow Sea and Tonghae Sea, with a coastline of 11,000
miles*

The Korean peninsula contains about $5,000 square

2
miles*

Geographically this peninsula is divided into the

mountainous northern part and plains-like area of the southern
region*

The northern portion of the peninsula is compara

tively rich in natural resources such as coal, iron ore,
tungsten, graphite, gold and other important minerals for
industrial development, as well as forests of spruce, fir
and pine*

The southern part of the peninsula is well suited

to the growing of agricultural products, which are mainly
rice, millet, wheat, barley, and beans*

With 11,000 miles

of coastline and the mixing of the cold Okhotsk current with
warm current of Mexico, the coastal waters along the penin
sula are well suited for fisheries*
Because of its geographical location, the Korean
peninsula has been influenced by Chinese culture and trans
mitted to Japan through 4,300 years of history.

In recent

years, the peninsula has become one of the areas of inter
national conflict.

This began with the Japanese occupation

of Korea during the period 1910-1943°
Effects of Japanese Occupation, 1910-1945«

2
Lee, J. H., A Handbook of Korea, (Seoul:
of Public Information, Republic of Korea, 1955)«»

After the

Office
p« 2.

5
treaty of Portsmouth in 1905, Japan dominated the Korean
3
peninsula and finally occupied it in 1910.
During the
period 1910-29, the Imperial Japanese government created
the administrative machinery of control and set the pattern
4
for exploitation of Korea.
Economic domination increased
during the period 1920-30, and until 1945 Japan made her
colony

a source of supply of goods for its growing militarism..
The basic Japanese

interest in the Korean economy is

well indicated by Table I, page 6.

This table shows that

agriculture in Korea was 46.4 percent of gross production
as compared with 16.1 percent in Japan, while industry in
Korea was 37*3 percent and 76.7 percent in Japan.

It means

that the Korean peninsula was furnishing to Japan*s rapidly
growing industry at that time a supply of food and raw
materials, and a market for its manufactured goods.

Thus

Japanese colonial policy was primarily planned to keep the
5
peninsula an agricultural area.
An increased output of rice was forcibly exported to
Japan during the Japanese

colonial rule.

The total rice

^McCune, George M . , Korea.Today, (N. Y.: Harvard
University Press, 1950), pp. 20-24. By 1936, the total
officials in Korea were 37,552, of which Koreans numbered
35,232 and Japanese 52,270.
4Ibid.
5Ibid.

6

TABLE I
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF GROSS VALUE OF
PRODUCTION IN KOREA AND JAPAN, 1938
Korea
Agriculture

1+6

Japan
16.1$

Forestry

5*5

2.2

Fishing

4.B

1.6

Mining

5»5

3*4

Industry

37. £
TOTAL

100

76.7
100

’

Source: Grajdanzev, Andrew J., Modern Korea, {The John
Day Company, 1944)* p« £4.

7
consumption available to Korea remained almost constant in
spite of a 50 percent increase in population during the
period 1915-1944.

6

Table II, page 8, shows that net

exports of rice to Japan increased continuously.
A comparison of per capita consumption of rice in
Korea, Table III, page 9, with the amount of its exports
to Japan, Table II, indicates the strong impact of the
Japanese colonial policy.

For instance, per capita domestic

consumption of rice in the four-year period 1930-1933 was
37 percent lower than that in the years 1915-1919.

But, the

percentage of the rice crop exported had increased to above
43 percent in the same period.
The Japanese colonial policy caused the Korean
peasantry to become poorer year by year, as shown in Table
IV, page 10.

This table shows that the percentage of land

owners decreased continuously, while other tenants increased
rapidly year by year.

"Other tenants” included lower scale
7
tenants, fire-field farmers (Kadenmin), and agriculture
laborers.

The area of ”fire-fields" was estimated at

202,15& chongbo (1 chongbo equals 2,4506 acres) in 1932,

^Lee, op. cit., pp. 139-42.
^"Kadenmin” means "fire-field farmers who have no
land of their own, but cultivate waste land owned by the
government or private owners. They lead a wandering life.

8

TABLE II
PRODUCTION, EXPORTS, AND DOMESTIC CONSUMPTION
OF BROWN RICE IN KOREA, 1915-1944
(In millions of U. S. dollars)

Period

Average annual
production

Net
Exports

Available
Supplies

Population
(Million)

1915-19

4,546

626

3,920

17.1

1920-24

4,675

1*133

3,537

13.6

1925-29

5,094

1,614

3,430

20.4

1930-34

5,694

2,694

2,734

22.1

1935-39

5,694

2,294

3,400

23.3

1940-44

6,246

2,396

3,650

25.1

Source; Lee, J. H., A Handbook of Korea, (Seoul; Office
of Public Information, Republic of Korea, 1955). pp. 14142. This table is an abridged copy.

9

TABLE III
PER CAPITA CONSUMPTION OF RICE IN KOREA
(In kokuo)
Average for

Amount

Index

1 9 1 5 -1 9 1 9

<>707

100

1920-1924

.638

90

1925-1929

.512

72

1930-1933

.449

63

1 9 3 4 -1 9 3 8

.396

56

Source: Grajdanzev, A. J., Modern Korea. (N. Y « :
John Day Company, 1944). p. 118.

The

10

TABLE IV
FARM FAMILIES IN DIFFERENT RELATIONSHIPS
TO LAND
(Percentages of the total number)
1918

1928

1932

.6

.7

1 02

2.5

3.1

2.5

Farmer-owners

19-7

18.5

16.6

Owner-tenants

39.5

32.3

25.9

Other tenants

37.7

45.4

53.8

Relationship
Non-farming landlords
Other landlords

TOTAL

100

100

100

Source: Grajdanzev, Ao J., Modern Korea,
John Day Company, 1944) 0 P 0 108 e

(N

The

11

366,601 chongbo in 1933, and 442,045 chongbo in 193
The more powerless families were pushed out to Manchuria
which was the new colonial area of Japan after 1932.
Japanese colonial controls of land in Korea were
systematically pursued through the Central Bank, the Bank
of Chosen, and the Oriental Development Company (largest
landowner in Korea) under the supervision of the Overseas
Ministry of the Japanese government.

With the approach of

the end of World War I I , Korean farmers were forced to
follow na delivery system of rice crop” at the official
price, and to receive the selling price of it several months
later.
Household industry was a significant part of Korean
economic life.

"As late as 193S, household industry was

responsible for 21.9 percent of the total value of production
in the textile industry;

15.6 percent in machinery and tools,
g
and 26.5 percent in ceramics."
Yet, this kind of household
industry could exist only where the farmers could obtain
raw materials cheaply and remain free from monopoly.

10

Household industry was carried on only by Koreans and their
situation underwent no improvement even by war conditions
after 1937 (Sino*.Japanese War, 1937-1945)*^
B

opc

•

_ ._

* !P0 ltf-2©

^Ibid., pp. 170-71.
1QIbid.
"^Grajdanzev, on. cit.. p. 21.

When the

12

Japanese industry came into this area and began to require
the materials, the Japanese authorities began to restrict
household industry.

Then the law and the polic powers

were increasingly employed to restrict the use of raw

12
materials.

As Grajdanzev said in 1944, it was true that

”a complete return to a natural economy is impossible be
cause home spinning and weaving are being destroyed by the
Government system of compulsory sales and the destruction
of looms, and because the burden of taxes and duties on such
13
enterprises is increasing.”
As a rule Koreans had to pay 25 percent higher
14
interest rates than the Japanese.
Outputs in industries,
for example, silk and cotton products, were required to be
sold to Japanese agents at depressed prices and to be
15
exported to Japan.
Korea*s merchandise imports during
the period 1910-1939 exceeded exports by the amount of 1,S8S
million yen, and the net exports of gold from Korea to Japan
16
amounted to 434»2 million yen in the same period.
Grajdanzev has described the Japanese colonial rule in Korea
by saying that "there are few countries in the world, even

^2Lee, op. cit•, p. 173.
^Grajdanzev, op. cit. . p. 121.
^"^McCune, op. cit. , p. 34*
15
Lee, op. cit., p. 172.

16

Grajdanzev, op. cit., p. 236.

13
among the colonies, where such a large portion of the good
17
(sic.) is taken out of the country.”
After all, only
an agricultural pattern was important to the Japanese
economy and an industrial pattern was necessary to comple'18
ment i t .
Table V, page 14, indicates some results of the
Japanese colonial policy in Korea.

It shows that technicians

and engineers constituted only .3 of 1 percent of the total
Korean workers in industry, while more than 32 percent of
Japanese workers in Korean industry were technicians and
engineers.

Under the Japanese colonial policy, few Koreans

were trained in school and prepared to obtained responsible
positions or wealth.

Little effort was made to prepare

them for technical or managerial positions.
Furthermore, a good deal of heavy industry established
by the Japanese and mainly located in northern Korea, pro
duced military supplies and consequently did not serve the
Korean economy itself.

Forestry and fishery, power and

mineral resources, transport and communication, banking
and financing, and the external trade of Korea were basically
directed to serve the Japanese military establishment,
19
especially during the years of World War II.
As a result,

17
Ibid.

18
Lee, o£. cit. , p. 172.
19
Grajdanzev, o£. cit., pp. 123-248.

14
TABLE V
EMPLOYMENT STATISTICS FOR KOREA, 1943
WORKERS
Category

Total

Koreans

Japanese

Others

Industry

549,751

512,907

26,966

9,373

Mining

133,353

173,331

1.935

2,542

Transportation

35,539

SO,123

4,791

670

Business

24,419

20,545

3,675

199

TECHNICIANS AND ENGINEERS
Industry

9,352

1,359

7,993

Mining

3,463

1,323

2,145

Transportation

1,125

122

1,003

Business

3,934

2,591

1,343

Source: McCuen, G. M . . Korea Today, ( N o Y«s Harvard
University Press, 1950)o Table 7. Industrial Employment
Statistics for all Korea, 1943, pp« 332-33.
This table is
an abridged copy of one appearing there.

15
the Korean economy relied mostly on the Japanese economy
for capital goods, and was also dependent on Japanese
industry for many consumer goods*
In other words, the basic resources were depleted
by the Japanese.

The farmers were mobilized into munitions

factories and land was over-planted.

Forests were overcut

for warships and minerals were intensively mined.

Industrial

20
plants deteriorated with heavy use and no replacement.
War inflation took place, and Koreans suffered discrimination
and social-economic pressure on every hand.

The self-

interested Japanese colonial policy was manifested directly
or indirectly in all economic activities.
However, that the Japanese contributed to the Korean
economy cannot be denied.

The Japanese built a good north-

south railway, modern port facilities, highways, communica
tions, an extensive postal system, and many government and
commercial buildings.

They established heavy industry to

promote modernization using coal and hydroelectric power in
the north part of Korea, and such lighter^industries as
textiles, rubber, and chemicals in the south.

A modern

banking and financial system was well developed over the

21
peninsula.

20

A feudalistic Korean society was rapidly

Lee, op. cit. , p. 172.
Lewis, John P . , Reconstruction and Development in
South Korea (Wash., D. C.l National Planning Association,
1955). p. 9.
21

changed to a modern society, and the population grew swiftly
with increasing agricultural productivity, expanding fisher
ies, and industrialization of the economy.

The Japanese

occupation virtually made the Korean economy the most
advanced on the Asian mainland by 1945.
The Japanese achievement in the Korean economy, was,
however, of little benefit to the Koreans.

The development

was undertaken only because of the necessity to complement
the Japanese economy, that is, to take maximum advantage of
22
its colonial position in the Korean peninsula.
Nor is it
necessary to think that the industrialization of the Korean
economy was owed only to the Japanese role.

After liberation

from the Japanese occupation in 1945, Korears economy was
further advanced, despite the difficult circumstances, as
shown in the succeeding chapters.
In summary, the effects of Japanese occupation were
both beneficial and detrimental to Korean economic develop
ment.

The Japanese advanced the economy from the feudalistic

to the modern stage.

However, they invested only the capital

up to the point where it could complement the Japanese grow23
ing economy during those days.
The Japanese economic
pressure in its development, preparation for war, and later

22
23

McCune, o£. cit., p. 30.

17
the war itself, led beyond the limits of economically
sound production for the natural resources in Korea.
Koreans generally believe that they would have been able to
develop their economy to a highly advanced stage without the
pressence of Japanese colonialism.,
Bo

THE KOREAN ECONOMY SINCE 1945

With liberation from the Japanese mile in 1945, the
Korean economy felt the full impact of its creation by the
Japanese militarism and its development solely as a supple
ment to the Japanese economye

Furthermore, the tremendous

task of redirecting and reconstructing the economy was
complicated by the international struggle over the newly
independent nation*

The Korean peninsula was divided in

1945 at the 3&th parallel and Russian and American troops
occupied the northern and southern parts respectively,,
Since then no communication between these two parts has taken
24
place*
Three years later, two Koreas were born on this
tiny peninsula.

Two years later, the limited accomplish

ments of rebuilding were destroyed by the devastating civil
war which was waged over almost the whole of Korea, and which
ended without solving the basic problem of unification of
Korea.

24
Cf.

Introduction, p. 1*

id

Liberation and Political Division of Korea*

The

international situation and conflicting idealogies of rival
powers have resulted in disappointment of the great expecta
tions of the Korean liberation in 1945*

Expectations of a

declaration at the Cairo conference in 1943 that "in due
course Korea shall be free and independent"

and the reaf

firmation of this promise at the Potsdam conference in 1945
were not realized.

The division at the 3&th parallel by the

United States and the Soviet Union cut the Korean peninsula
along its center and has been a fatal blow to the entire
Korean economy.
Before liberation from the Japanese, Korears inter
national position was already established.

The so-called

Provisional Government of Korea had been maintained in China
25
since 1919°
With the approach of the end of World War II,
the Korean independence movements in China, the Soviet Union,
and the United States had become particularly active.

In

March of 1942, Koreans, mainly those residing in the United
States, assembled to have a Liberty Conference in Washington
for the purpose of obtaining diplomatic action on behalf of

26
Korea.

Though these efforts gained only an expression of

sympathy, they influenced later discussion of Korea by the

25
McCune, op. cit., p. 41°

26
Ibid., p. 42.

19
27
members of the Pacific War Council in Washington.
The Cairo declaration concerning Korea in 1943 was
that ’’the aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the
enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in
due course Korea shall become free and independent.”

After

the San Francisco meeting of the United Nations in 1945,
the United States and the Soviet Union agreed that a shortterm trusteeship by four powers (the United States, the
Soviet Union, the United Kongdom, and China) would be the
23
best preliminary step toward Korean independence.
Before
this agreement could be implemented, however, separation of
the Korean peninsula into two militarily occupied zones had
taken place.

Russian troops moved into northern Korea in
29
September of 1945o
In December, 1945, the Moscow Foreign Ministers Con
ference concluded an agreement that a Joint Commission be
formed by the American and Soviet occupation forces for the
purpose of setting up a provisional government for the whole
30
of Korea.
Eventually the efforts of the Joint Commission
proved unsuccessful.

The southern zone was formed into the

27ibid.
23
Lee, op. cit. , pp. 43-44.
29Ibid., p. 61.
3°Ibid.

20

Republic of Korea on August 15, 194$, by the resolution of
the United Nations General Assembly, and was recognized by
the United States, the United Kingdom, China and Canada
31
early in 1949.
On the other hand, the Korean PeopleTs
Republic came into being one month later in the Russian zone,
and has since been recognized by the Soviet Union, the
P e o p l e d Republic of China, and the eastern European coun32
tries.
The divergency between the two sides become deeper
and deeper with the passing of time*
Thus, Korea has become a burning point in present
Asian politics, with two opposing governments existing on
the tiny peninsula.

The division at the 3$th parallel,

which was originally proposed "to provide a convenient allo
cation of responsibility for the acceptance of the Japanese
33
surrender,"
seemed to herald the tragedy of the Korean War
five years later.

The war resulted not only in making more

difficult the unification of Korea, but also in total damage
34
of about $3 billion over the peninsula.
The Korean
economy rushed into destruction with no chance to rebuild
itself from the suffering caused by the forty years of

-^Bird, E. M . . Asian Annual 1956, (London:
World, 1956). p. 6 3 .

Eastern

32Ibid.
^3Truman, Harry S., Year of Decision, Vol. I, (N. Y.:
Doubleday and Company, 1955). p. 522.
34
The Bank of Korea, ojd cit. , I, 181.

.

21

Japanese colonialism.

Koreans now wonder if liberation of

194-5 was indeed an emancipation, or if it was only a
substitution of other foreign powers for the Japanese.
As long as the Korean problem remained linked with
the deteriorating relations between the United States and
the Soviet Union, the separation has continued and Korea
has been divided despite the homogeneous background of
history9 culture, and the economy.

Thus, the basic Korean

problem could not be expected to resolve itself satisfactorily.
But the division is a fait accompli.
35
The Korean War and its Aftermath.

The greater part;

of the Korean territory was fought over two or three times
during the war.

Many villages and cities, especially some

industrial areas, were destroyed by heavy American bombing.
More than a million persons died by gunfire, starvation, and
36
cold in southern Korea alone.
In 1951, "probably close to
half of all south Koreans fell into some refugee or relief
37
category.”
Besides, 1.5 million refugees may have come
33
from northern Korea during the war.

3^This description of the effects of the War concerns
the Republic of Korea (southern Korea), because no informa
tion is available about northern Korea.
^^Lewis, 0£. cit., p. 16.
37Ibid.

33

United Nations, Economic Survey of Asia and the Far
East, 1955, (N.Y.; Department of Economic Affairs,' 19561. p. 141.

22

Between 1945 and 1950, the population jumped to over
20 millions, a 25 percent increase, including about one
million repatriates from Japan and 1.5 million northern
Korean refugees.

The estimated population of south Korea

was approximately 22 million in September of 1955

The

pressure of unusual increases in population has been a
serious problem to the economy.
During the Second World War, the Korean peninsula had
escaped damages, but all Korea suffered losses of about $3
billion by this new war.

For southern Korea alone, an

official estimate puts the total property damage at about
39
f>l,$00 million.
"Perhaps a third of south KoreaTs housing
units and substantial proportions of its schools, other
public buildings, roads, and bridges were either destroyed
40
or damaged."
Damages to industrial facilities alone are
estimated at $354 million, including "43$ of all industrial
facilities, 41$ of all power-generating installations, and
41
50$ of all coal-raining facilities."
Moreover, most productive enterprises were disrupted
by the movement of armies and refugees, and became stagnant
because of raw material or electric power shortages.

Man

power was mobilized into the army from the agricultural dis-

^ T h e Bank of Korea, og. cit. , I, lSl.
40
Lewis, 0£. cit. , p. 16.
^ U n i t e d Nations.
op . cit. , p. 140.

Department of Economic Affairs,
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triots, and farm production decreased.

A large portion of

the labor force was unemployed, and many died.

The govern

ment budget was alloted heavily toward military defenses.
Table VI, page 2.4, shows the dramatic reduction in output for
selected commodities as a result of the war.
The increase of paper money issue and comparatively
lower transactions owing to bitter wartime shortages led
the price level up without stopping, despite a vigorous
stabilization effort by concerned authorities.

From 1950 to

1953 wholesale prices rose fifteen times and retail prices
twenty times.

The accumulated price level increased 10,000
42
fold from 1945 to 1953«
Foreign Aid.

Assuming that the problem of division

of the Korean peninsula at the 33th parallel will not be
solved for some time in the future, foreign aid seems to be
a necessity for growth and development of the economy under
the present circumstances.

With stationing of the American

Army in Korea, foreign aid was provided to Korea from funds
of Government and Relief in Occupation Areas appropriations,
which were for relief items - food, clothing, fertilizer,
and petroleum - but nothing was done to improve the poor
43
industrial facilities.
By 1949* the Economic Cooperation

^2Lewis, ag. cit., pp. 17-13.
43
Brown, William A., Jr., American Foreign Assistance.
(Washington, D. C.s The Brookings Institution, 1953)« p« 373•
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TABLE VI
WARTIME CHANGES IN SOUTH KOREA*S
PRODUCTION OF SELECTED COMMODITIES
(1945 - 100)
1950

1951

1952

96

73

65

73

92

39

53

10

54

Cotton sheeting

35

57

67

Common brick

74

53

S2

34

26

66

Staple foods (rice, other grains;
pulses, and potatoes ...........

Source: Lewis, John P., Reconstruction and Development in
South Korea (Washington, D. C.: National Planning Associ
ation, 1955), p» 17.
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Administration program was established for building a selfsupporting Korean economy, but, owing to the Korean War, it
was in vain.

With the war, the Civil Relief in Korea and

the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency for longrun plans to reconstruct the economy, were established
simultaneously in 1950 by resolution of the United Nations
44
General Assembly.
These agencies have made significant contributions to
the stabilization of the price level and rebuilding of basic
industry in Korea under difficult circumstances.

A more

detailed treatment of foreign aid to Korea will be given in
the succeeding chapters.

44

The Bank of Korea, 0£. cit. » I, 181.

CHAPTER II
PROBLEMS OF THE KOREAN ECONOMY
The Korean economy has been doubly handicapped since
World War I I , even neglecting the aftermath of Japanese
colonialism.

One handicap was the separation of the economy

along the 3#th parallel and another the military occupation
by foreign troops.

These things predestined the tragic war,

and they continue to make a solution of Korea’s economic
problems extremely difficult.
A.

PATTERN OF THE KOREAN ECONOMY

Zonal Division of the Economy.

During the 36 years

of the Japanese colonial rule in Korea, the Japanese economic
development of Korea was never considered to be for the
Korean national economy as a whole.

But, for their own

purposes, the Japanese had contributed substantially to the
economic development of Korea and carried out the rationali
zation of its industry.
The uneven distribution of economic resources between
north and south of the peninsula, however, had made each
region complementary to the other.

The utilization of this

complementary situation was completely prevented by the
division of Korea at the 38th parallel.

26

Factories were
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located in one zone, but a part of facilities in the other.
The larger part of the mineral resources was in the northern
area with the heavy industry, while agriculture and light
1
industry was concentrated in south Korea.
As long as there
was no means of exchanging the raw materials for consumer
goods produced in the south, the abundant mineral resources
and heavy industry of the northern part of Korea were almost
2
useless to the northern Koreans.
On the other hand, the
southern part of Korea had many light manufacturing plants
3
which required raw materials from northern Korea.
For
example, the fanner needs fertilizer and factories need
4
electric power from north Korea.
Table V I I , page 2# shows that the southern area had
three times as much cultivated paddy acreage as the northern
area.
This contrast between two zones reflects geographical
features and differences in land utilization.

As shown in

the table, southern Korea was mostly a rice-cultivating area
and northern Korea a dry-field region.
Industrial characteristics of the two zones are shown
in Table VIII, page 29*

McCune, George M . , Korea Today, (N. Y.:
University Press, 1950), pp. 52-60.
2Ibid., p. 54.
3Ibid. . pp. 54-55*
4Ibid., p. 55.

Harvard
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TABLE VII
CULTIVATED AREA IN NORTHERN AND
SOUTHERN KOREA, 1944
(ACRES)
Paddy

Dry field

Total

Southern zone

3,072,300

2,695,000

5,767,300

Northern zone

1,097,600

5,343,450

6,441,050

Source; McCune, George M . , Korea Today, (N.-Y.:
University Press, 1950), p. 53*

Harvard

29

TABLE VIII
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION,
NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN KOREA, 1940
(All Korea = 100 percent)
Goods

South

Heavy I n d u s t r y .......... . . . . .
Chemicals
Metals

.........

14%

North
S6

. . . . . .

12

SB

................. . . . .

15

&5

Ceramic (Including cement) . . .

30

70

Gas and Electric . . . . . . . .

15

B5

Light Industry

.................

74

25

Textiles

........................ B6

14

Machines
Lumber

........

70

30

. . . . . . . . . . . .

70

30

65

35

Fo o d

Printing . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 0

10

Miscellaneous

24

. . . . . . . . . 7 6

Source: McCune, George M . , Korea Today, (N. Y.:
Harvard
University Press, 1950), p. 57« This table is an abridged
copy of the one appearing there.
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Table VIII shows that southern Korea is significant
in the output of light manufacturing products for the whole
economy (74 percent), while northern Korea is predominant
as the center of heavy industry (86 percent).
The mining industry presents another contrast, as
shown in Table IX, page 31*

Some minerals are found princi

pally in northern Korea and others in southern Korea.
ticularly significant

Par

is the fact that northern Korea posses

ses the lion’s share of those minerals which count for most
in an industrial economy, namely, coal, iron ore, lead, lime
stone, nickel, pyrite, titanium, and zinc.

The south has

nearly one half of the tungsten, a vital mineral in the
steel industry.

The peninsula’s richness in mineral

resources, composed of over 300 different sorts of mineral
ore, deserves special attention.

The deposit of tungsten
5
in all Korea is the sixth largest in the world.
B.

THE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
During World War II Korea suffered a great deal in

directly.

Many young Koreans were pressed into Japanese labor

mobilization and the economic losses were substantial.

Indus

try pushed production beyond its capacity, farmers suffered
from low selling prices of "a delivery system of rice crop,*’

5
Bird, E. M . , Asian Annual 1957, (London:
World, 1957), p® 67®

Eastern
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TABLE II
PERCENTAGES OF SELECTED MINERALS, NORTHERN
AND SOUTHERN KOREA, 1944
(All Korea ■ 100 percent)
Minerals
Alunite

South
100

Apatite

North
—
100

Asbestos

95

5

Barite

75

25

Coal

21

79

Cobalt .

100

—

Copper

55

45

Gold

37

63

Graphite

44

56

Iron Ore

3

97

43

57

2

9$

Lead
Limestone
Magnesite

—

Mica

10

90

Nickel

29

71

Pyrite

—

100

100

Titanium

5

95

Tungsten

54

46

Zinc

25

75

Source: McCune, George M . , Korea Today,
University Press, 1950), p. 5&«

(No Y.:
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and forests were laid bare by excessive cutting.

The

weakened economy became worse with the separation at the 38th
parallel*

Business in southern Korea suddenly lost its export

market and essential raw materials.

Even worse, the estab

lishment of two governments in the tiny land led to virtual
stagnation of the economy.

After liberation, southern Korea

was thrown into temporary political chaos.

Normal economic

activities ceased and inflation reached serious proportions.
Fortunately, foreign aid and government efforts made a
significant contribution to the economy, even during the
war.
Gross National Product.

Owing to social confusion

after 1945, gross national product estimates were not avail
able until the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency

6
published these statistics in 1953»

The gross national

product during the period 1949-50 was about $1.75 billion
and per capita income was about $92 per year.

7

National
B
income was supplemented by $110 million foreign aid.
As shown in Table X, gross national product declined
dramatically from $1 ,7 7 0 million to $1,384 million during the
war and net imports increased three times by the period,

^Lewis, John P., Reconstruction and Development in
South Korea, (Washington, D. C.s National Planning Association, 1955 J, p. 15.
7Ibid.
^Ibid.
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TABLE X
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT AND NET IMPORTS,
ORIGIN AND USES OF TOTAL RESOURCES,
SELECTED TEARS
(In millions of U. S. dollars)

1949-50

Items
Gross national product
by industrial origin o

. . , 1,770

Agriculture and forestry .
Fisheries
. . e . * . . .
Mining
o
e e o o o o o o
Manufacturing
. • . . e .
C o n s t ruction
. • o . . «
W h o l e s a l e and retail trade
Services, foreign tradeo .
and finance
. . . . . •
Transportation and publ i c
utilities
o e . . . » .
Government
.
.
.
.
«
.
o
Service to U.N. C o mm a n d
•
Net import
Total available resources.

.

1952-53

1953-5

1,334

1 ,721

374
65
15
132
43
133

64
56
17
146
16
96

765
53
23
139
42
139

233

175

231

32
130
—

41
156
40

45
139
40

110

160

451

1,330

P e rsonal consumption . . . 1,440
Gross domestic investment
170
270
Government service
. . .

1,544 '

2 ,172

1,069
75
400

1 ,325
197
650

Source; Lewis, John P., Reconstruction and Development
in South Korea, (Washington, Do C.; National Planning
Association, 1955), p° 13•
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1953-1954*

Government service was successively increased,

while domestic investment was drastically reduced.

This

table reveals a basic need for more production, more private
and public capital facilities, and more exports.
The shortage of gross national product relative to
gross national expenditure was filled by foreign aid
averaging 10 percent of gross national product, as depicted
in Table XI, page 35*
Even with foreign aid, per capita income was only
about $92 per year.

This may be compared with $100 in
9
Japan, $57 in India, and $36 in Burma.
Government Budget.

In Table XII, page 36, the

proportion of foreign aid to total government revenues in
1955 was very large, amounting to 44*3 percent.
Among expenditures, those for national defense were
38.3 percent and for reconstruction only 21.5 percent.

The

amount of foreign aid (44*3 percent) was nearly matched by
national defense expenditure (3^.3 percent).
The Balance of Payments.

It is characteristic of

the Korean balance of payments that the scale of foreign
trade is small and supplemented by foreign aid.

Table XIII,

page 3S, shows Korea as an immature debtor nation.

Commodity

imports, mainly consumer goods, exceeded commodity exports.

9Ibid. , p. 14*
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TABLE XI
RELATION OF GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT, EXPENDITURE,
AND FOREIGN AID, 1954-1956
(In billion hwan)

Year

Gross National
Product

1954

659 o 9

72S.3

63.4

1955

1,042.3

1,139.9

97.6

1956

1,269.0

1,427.3

153.3

Source:
(Korea:
I, 179.

Gross National
Expenditure

Foreign Aid

The Bank of Korea, Annual Economic Review 1957,
The Research Department, Bank of Korea, 1957),
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TABLE XII
STATUS OF REPUBLIC OF KOREA GOVERNMENT BUDGET, 1955
(In millions of hwan)

Items

Total

Percentage
Distribution

Revenues;
Taxes

111,156

Foreign aid (counterpartfunds)a
Other*3

133,404
66,735

TOTAL

301,296

36o91o
44.3
18.8

100

Expenditures;
General account

96,939

32.1

115,727

38.3

Reconstruction

65,101

21.5

Other°

24,389

8.1

National defense

TOTAL

302,154

100

Counterpart funds compose refunds from ICA, UNKRA
and other sources.
C o m p o s e d of receipts from government enterprises
and properties, other revenues, national bonds, and special
accounts.
C o m p o s e d of national bonds and special accounts.
Source: The Bank of Korea, Annual Economic Review 1957,
(Korea: The Research Department, Bank of Korea, 1958)",
I, 18-19.
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The excess of exports was supplemented by extensive foreign
aid, mainly from the United States#

This.phenomenon

precipitated the controversy in setting up the exchange
rate between the dollar and the hwan, the Korean monetary
unit, which will be treated below under exchange rate#
In respect to Koreafs balance of payments, the table
on the following page shows that on 1955, debits exceed the
credits by $266,4^3 thousand, that is, the difference
between debits of $354»&&7 thousand and credits of only
$66,404 thousand#

But, the small amount of credit is

supplemented by $272,649 thousand of donations, as shown in
item II of the same table#
C.

INFLATION

The inflationary tendency in Korea is severe and
constitutes a basic problem#

This tendency was inherited

from the Japanese colonial economy#

In 1939 the money

supply was 30 million yen but it increased to 1.6 billion
yen in 1944 and to 6 billion yen on August 31, 1945#

Cur

rency issue was suddenly increased by the Japanese adminis-

10
tration during the month of August, 1945«

The shortage of

raw materials, the crippled industry, scarcity of consumer
goods, and the desperate Japanese administration during the

■^Lee, J# H#, A Handbook of Korea, (Seoul: Office
of Public Information, Republic of Korea, 1955), p<> 247#
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TABLE XIII
ABBREVIATED KOREAN BALANCE OF PAYMENTS, 1955
(Thousands of U. S . dollars)
Items

Credit

Debit

TL6
J
A.

Current account
1.
2.
3.
A.
5.
6.
7.

Merchandise
Travel
Non-monetary gold
movement
Transportation and
insurance
Investment income
Government transactions
Miscellaneous

165,604

$344,433

17,602
352

327,325
1,633

114
763
1,646
43,#40
1,232

B.

Capital and Monetary Gold

—

Co

Net Errors and Ommission

BOO

TOTAL
II.

Donations (foreign aid)*
NET TOTAL

423
__
13,097
1,455
10,399
—

$66,404

$354,337

272,349

4,364

$339,253

$359,251

*The items of donations include private gifts.

Source: The Bank of Korea, Annual Economic Review 1957»
(Korea: The Research Department, Bank of Korea, 1957),
IV, 211-12.
This table is abridged.
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last stage of the Second World War contributed to the infla
tionary pressures in the Korean economy.

Furthermore, this

tendency was exaggerated and became "a chronic social con-

11
dition”

by the administrative vacuum - rampancy of brokers

(monopolists of consumer goods), the increasing flood of
currency, the general shut-down of production in 1945 and a
decreased production during the years of 1945-1948, and
finally, the Korean war of 1950-1953®
During the two or three months before the Japanese

12
surrender, the price level increased 20 to 25 times.

From

1945 to 1950, retail prices rose 25 times and wholesale

12
prices 29 times.

From 1950 to 1953 retail prices increased
13
20-fold and wholesale prices more than 15-fold.
Conse- .
quently, the accumulated price level increased by 10,000-fold
14
during the period 1945-1950.
At last, a currency revaluation was carried out in
1953 and about 8 percent of the money supply outstanding was
frozen as of June 30.

This was more than offset by the

increase of 23 percent in the total money supply from the
15
end of 1952 to June 30, 1953®
By the currency revaluation

Lewis, 0£. cit. , p. 17®
12Ibid.
13Ibid., pp. 17-18.

^^Ibid.
^Lee, o£. cit., p. 251®
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the government was aided in the collection of back taxes
through reducing the money supply for transactions, and
16
restoring the people’s confidence in the currency.
Table XIV, page 41, shows relations of money supply
and principal influences upon the money supply during the
period 1945-1953•
As shown in the table, the government overdrafts
at the Bank of Korea had a tremendous impact upon the total
money supply, and the expansion of bank credit to other
borrowers was also significant.

In this connection, the

successively increasing advances of local currency to the
United Nations Command was in considerable degree responsible
for the serious inflation during the first two years of the
17
war.
Besides, the intensified shortages of all goods and
services, decreased production, and over-population during
16
the war must be remembered.
The inflationary tendency, however, has been moder
ated with the establishment of the single exchange rate
between dollars and hwan in 1955o
following section.

16

Ibid., pp. 243-249*

17Ibid.
Ibid.

This is treated in the

TABLE XIV
MONEY SUPPLY AND PRINCIPAL FACTORS AFFECTING
THE MONEY SUPPLY, 1945-1953
(In million hwan)
Items

1946

1945

Money Supplya
114.3 248*5
Government Overdraft
60*5
Bonds held by Bank of Korea
Bank loans to Gov’t Agency
2.3 40*4
Bonds held by Other Banks*
Bank loans to Gov’t Agency*
Bank Credit to Public Sector
3.1 100.9
8*8 11.3
Bank Credit to Private Sector
B. 0. K* loans to Private
8.8 11.3
Borrowers*
Other Banks Loans to Private
Borrowers
B. 0, K. Purchases of foreign
exchange*
18.1
Savings and Time Deposits*
Deposits of foreign organizations* —
Other Deposits0
102*4 154.4
* 8

—

-

- -

—

_

—

_

-—

_

1947

1948 1949

494.5
169

696 1,211 2,831 7,304 14,325 30,316
286
389 2,095 4,306 5,958 11,490
126
33
13
24
550 1,380 1,847 •Hp111
248
24
215
644
71
246 1,080 2,858
310
637 2,239 5,201 8,657 16,965
18
38
33 2,269 5,640 16,009

7.5
—

—

- -

176.5
12.6
12.6

-—

30.2
—

335.6

1950

—

—

—

«...

18

38

«*• mm

—

41

60

«MB W m

—

409

596

1951

1952

1953

-

33

7
55
61
668

267

229

732

2,002

5,411 15,277

71
127
94
-16

122 1,264
273 2,325
323
23
262 -1,154

aMoney supply consists of Bank of Korea notes and monetary deposits*
^With the exclusion of the Korean Reconstruction Bank from the coverage of banking
institutions its deposits with the Bank of Korea have been included in "other” and so
the figures of "other” have been revised*
*In these items the data indicated by dashes were not available.
Source; The Bank of Korea, Annual Economic Review, 1957, (Korea;
ment, Bank of Korea, 1957), IV, 16*

The Research Depart
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D.

EXCHANGE RATE

The exchange ratio between United States dollars and
the Korean hwan has played an important role in the Korean
economy.

As mentioned previously, Korea received foreign

aid amounting to about $1,435 million during the period from
1945 to 1955*

Money supply in Korea has steadily increased

from year to year, as mentioned in Section C,

As a result,

the price level has risen and exchange rates have been
changed by the Korean government seven times during the
period from 1945 to 1955°

Besides, there have been at least

five different exchange rates of hwan to U. S, dollars during
the same decade.

Official exchange rates and the five kinds

of it from 1945 to 1955 are given in Table XV, page 43®
As the Korean price level rose, it was inevitable that
Korea would try to keep the lowest possible exchange rate
for foreign aid goods and services in order to hold down the
hwan prices of American products.

For example, the total

foreign economic aid to Korea in 1955 was about $244 thou19
sand, under the exchange rate of 500 hwan to one dollar.
Suppose that the exchange rate had been changed from 500 to
1,000 hwan for one dollar.

Then $244 thousand worth of

foreign economic aid would buy for Korea only half as much
foreign products.

This is why the establishment of "the

19
The Bank of Korea, op. cit. , IV, 221.
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TABLE XV
EXCHANGE RATES OF HWAN TO U.S. DOLLARS, 1945-1955
(Rates of hwan to one U.S. dollar)
U.N. Finance
Office Rate_______

Effective
Year

CounterOfficial part Fund
Rate
Rate
To G.I.

Weighted
average of
To other U.S. Armytransac- dollar*s
tions
auctions

--

--

—

—

—

—

—

--

—

14

25

25

—

60

60

60

60

—

1953

ISO

ISO

ISO

170

25S

1955

500

500

500

500 ■

729

1945

-5

1943

4.5

1949

9

1950

IS

1951

4.5

——

Note: U. N. hwan advances were repaid at the various
rates from May, 1954 to August, 1955« Detailed information
is available in this source.

Source:
(Korea:
IV, £5.

The Bank of Korea, Annual Economic Review 1957»
The Research Department, Bank of Korea, 1957)7
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single exchange rate” between dollars and hwan in 1955 has
been conditioned by the American government’s limitation
that the price level be sustained within 25 percent annually,
20
otherwise economic aid will be suspended.
On the other hand, U.N. forces’ hwan advances were

21
about 12,000 million hwan in 1955*

If the exchange rate

climbs from 500 to 1,000 hwan for one dollar, the Korean
government will receive only -$12 million instead of $24 million*
Furthermore, the actual transactions in Korea are taken over
in terms of Korean currency to foreign agencies and firms,
no matter what the black market ratio may be*

Thus, foreign

agencies will suffer from this official rate - maybe the
black market rate being double - and cancel some contrasts*
Eventually, reconstruction programs will be delayed by
unwillingness of foreign agencies.
With foreign economic aid being about $97 million more
22
in 1955. than in 1954, the establishment of the single ex
change rate and the government’s retrenchment in financial
policy have contributed greatly to deterring the inflationary
tendency.

20Ibido, I, 1.
21Ibid., IV, 123.
22Ibid* . 221.
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E.

RECONSTRUCTION

As developed in the previous sections of this chapter,
the Korean economy, owing to unbalanced resources and
political influences, could not develop in a normal way.

Re

construction programs, however, have been worked out for the
purpose of rebuilding basic industries with assistance from
such programs as the International Cooperation Administration
and the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency.

The

Korean government is also endeavoring to rebuild its economy.
As a result, a significant amount of reconstruction has
already been accomplished in industrial facilities, mining,
irrigation, housing, and fertilizer factories.

Gross

national product and per capita income made moderate increases
during the period 1953 to 1955» (Table XVI, page 46).
The table shows about a 10 percent annual rate of
increase in gross national product and improvement of per
capita income.

With the exception of war-time booms, this

rate of increase was experienced by few advanced countries.
Since 1953» the government retrenchment policy and
effective foreign economic aid have greatly contributed to
the rehabilitation and stabilization of the economy.

Details

concerning this aid to Korea will be given in the following
chapter.
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TABLE XVI
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT AND
PER CAPITA INCOME
Income

1953

Gross national product
in million hwan
Index

100

Total population in
thousands
Index

20,344
100

Per capita income
in hwan
Index

432,409

23,127
100

1954
529,435
109-S

21,173
101 .6

25,000
107.1

1955
563,317
119*3

21,526
103.3

26,169
113.2

Notes
The figures are estimates by the Bank of
Korea with consideration given to inflation during the
period 1953-1955.

Source:
(Korea:
I, 175.

The Bank of Korea, Annual Economic Review 1957.
The Research Department, Bank of Korea, 1957),
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CHAPTER III
FOREIGN AID TO KOREA
The foreign economic aid programs to Korea have been
largely the response of the United States foreign assistance
programs as ninety percent of foreign aid to Korea has come
1
from the United States®
A brief review of American foreign
aid policy will be necessary to understand the full situa
tion of foreign aid to Korea®
A.

A GENERAL REVIEW OF AMERICAN FOREIGN AID

From the Second World War to 1955* the United States
contributed about $52 billion in all kinds of foreign aid
2
to many countries®
Much of this went to Western Europe to
help the recovery of war-damaged areas and to check the
communist expansion®

3

Even though the amount of foreign aid

by the United States is large it represents a comparatively
small proportion of its annual gross national product (see
Table XVII, page 4#)®

For instance, beginning in 1950 less

than two percent of the country’s national product has been
given each year in foreign assistance®

In this connection,

^"See Introduction®
2
The Brookings Institution, Administrative Aspects of
United States Foreign Assistance Programs, Committee Print,
85 Cong® 1 Sess®, p. 4®
3Ibid.

4$
TABLE XVII
UNITED STATES GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT,
TOTAL FEDERAL EXPENDITURE FOR GOODS
SERVICES, AND FOREIGN AID
(In billion dollars)
Federal expenditure for
goods and s e r v i c e s ________

209.2

23.6

5.04

1947

232.2

20.5

6.61

194^

257.3

22

1949

257.3

1950

4.97

2.4

.04

6.57

2.9

5.22

.03

4.92

JO
«
O

1946

0
0

Total foreign
Gross
Foreign Aid Expenditures aid as % of
national
gross national
Year product Total Total Military Economic
product____

26.1

5.36

.21

5.65

2.3

2S5

22.3

4.17

.53

3.64

1.5

1951

32S.2

41.2

4.66

1.47

3.19

1.4

1952

345.4

54.7

4.9^

2.60

2.3 d

1.4

1953

363.2

59.7

6.31

4.25

2.06

1.7

1954

360.7

4S eS

4.72

3.16

1.56

1.3

19 55

390.9

47

4.30

3.13

2.17

1.1

Source;
The Brookings Institution, Administrative Aspects
of United States Foreign Assistance Programs, Committee
Print, 85 Cong, I Sess., p. 4«
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Korea received $243*931 thousand of foreign aid in 1955°
This is less than *07 percent of the American gross national
product.
For analysis purposes foreign aid may be divided into
four periods:-7 the first period (1945-194&) emphasizes post
war rehabilitation;

the second (194S-1951) is dominated by

the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), until the
creation of the Mutual Security Act of 1951;

the third

(1951-1955) by the Foreign Operation Administration (FOA);
and the fourth period from the establishment of the Inter
national Cooperation Administration (ICA) in June, 1955* to
date.
The Mutual Security Act of 1951 marked the turning
point in the administration of foreign aid programs from
6
.
economic to defense objectives.
By this Act (1951)* the
military and economic aids to foreign countries have been
7
integrated into one assistance program.
In brief, the main provisions of the Mutual Security
Act of 1951 are as follows:

It gives "the Director responsi

bility for continuous supervision, general direction, and

(Korea:
I, 1S1.

^"The Bank of Korea, Annual Economic Review 1957»
The Research Department, Bank of Korea, 19577,
^The Brookings Institution, o£. cit., p. 5°
6Ibid.
7Ibid
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coordination of the military, economic, and technical
assistance program;" it gives "the Secretary of Defense
primary operating responsibility for the military-assistance
program;" and it gives "the Secretary of State operating
responsibility for the technical cooperation program, for
support of similar programs in certain international
8
organizations, and for certain minor activities*"
Since the establishment of the Mutual Security Act
of 1951, operation of foreign assistance has been divided
among the Mutual Security Agency which is responsible for
economic assistance;

the Technical Cooperation Administra

tion for technical cooperation;

and the Department of

Defense for military assistance*
B.

HISTORY OF FOREIGN AID TO KOREA

Thehistory of foreign aid to Korea begins
American foreign assistance.

with

During the period from 1945

to 1955 > the foreign aid to Korea may be classified into
three definable periods*
The First Period*
the gift of relief goods
Government

Foreign aid to Korea began with
under a separate program of the

and Relief in Occupation Area (GARIOA) at the

^Ibid*, p* 10*
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close of* the Second World War«

9

It was administered by the

Army of Occupation and provided food, clothing, and ferti
lizer, with no consideration for the reorganization of the
Korean e c o n o m y . ^

During the period 1945-1949, #502 million

worth of goods was donated by GARIOA."^
The Second Period.

The second period began with

appropriation of $150 million from the Economic Cooperation
Administration (ECA) in 1949*

12

In June, 1949, the President

of the United States asked Congress for economic assistance
to Korea in order "to resist and reject Communist propaganda”
for fear that "the Asian people would begin to doubt the
13
practical superiority of democratic principles."
This
first attempt of foreign economic program for long-run
planning of the Korean economy was pursued by the Office of
Planning of the Korean government with the United States
Economic Cooperation Administration until April of 1951.

14

The ECA program has been succeeded by the Foreign Operation
g
tance,
"3777“

Brown, W. A., and Opie, R » , American Foreign Assis
(Wash., D. C.s The Brookings institution, 19i>i), p<>

10

Ibid.

■^The Bank of Korea, op. cit. , IV, 221.

12 Brown, W. A., and Opie, R . , op. cit. . p. 373.
13Ibid. . p. 375.
■^United Nations, Economic Survey of Asia and the Far
East. 1956, (New Yorks Department of Economic Affairs,
1955), p. 141.

52
Administration (FOA) during the period 1951 to 1953 and
later to the International CooDeration Administration
15
(ICA).
By 1955 the total amount of the American economic

16
aid to Korea under these operations was $402,9&7 thousand*
Besides, there was military assistance of $10*97 million
appropriated under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act, which
was signed as a bilateral agreement between the Republic
17
of Korea and the United States in January of 1950*
But,
owing to the Korean War (1950-1953), the ECA program for
long-run planning was in vain, though the ICA had made
significant contributions to the rebuilding of the Korean
economy*
The Third Period*

Having closed down in April of

1951, the ECA functions were transferred to the United
Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA), which was in
accordance with the General Assembly resolution of December

IB
1, 1950.

Prior to this resolution, the Civil Relief in

Korea aid (CRIK), similar to the GARIOR was adopted by the
Security Council of the United Nations General Assembly on

■^The Bank of Korea, oj>* cit. , IV, 221.
16,
Ibid,
17
Brown, W. A. and Opie, A.,

ojd.

cit* . pp. 3B0-62.

Second Report to Congress on the Mutual Security
Programs, Washington * D. C*s U» S* Govft Printing Office,
1952), pp. 33-34.
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June, 1950.

By 1955 UNKRA aid amounted to $73,276

20
thousand and CRIK $4 5 7 ,0 4 7 thousando

Through the ICA,

UNKRA, and CRIK programs, aid has been continued up to the
present time.
The following quotation reveals the complicated nature
of foreign aid programs during the period from 1950 to 1953®
After the cessation of hostilities, and as soon as
military circumstances permit, such responsibility
will be transferred to UNKRA in addition to its
present responsibility for longer term rehabilita
tion.
In addition, UNKRA is employing and paying
staff personnel being furnished to the United
Nations Civil Assistance Command during the period
which that Command is responsible for emergency
direct civilian r e l i e f . 21
With ICA funds, UNKRA in cooperation with the Office
of Planning of the Korean Government, has planned a number
of substantial rehabilitation projects for the Korean economy.
These programs have been contributing to the control of
inflation and to building up the basic industries of the
Korean economy.
C.

ANALYSIS OF FOREIGN ECONOMIC AID PROGRAMS

With the exception of relief aids, up to 1955 the
long-run aid programs (ECA, FOA, ICA, UNKRA) to Korea have
contributed $393,047 thousand, as shown in Table XVIII, page

■^The Bank of Korea, o£. c i t . , IV, 221.
20

‘‘' Mutual Security Agency, oj>. cit., p. 34.

21

Ibid.
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TABLE XVIII
SUMMARY OF FOREIGN ECONOMIC AID AND
RELIEF GOODS RECEIVED, 1945-1955
(In thousands of dollars)

Year

Total

g a r i OA

ECA

U.S.A«
FOA

ICA

U..N.
UNKRA

CRIK

1945

4,934

4,934

—

— '

—

—

—

1946

49,496

49,496

—

—

—

—

—

1947

175,371 175,371

—

—

—

—

—

1943

179,593 179,593

—

—

—

—

—

1949

116,509

23,306

—

—

—

—

1950

53,706

■—

49,330

--

—

1951

106,420

—

10,030

2 1 ,8 9 2

1952

159,739

—

—

3,824

1953

193,456

—

—

232

1954

147,252

—

—

—

92,703

__
1955 243_»931
Total
1 ,435,407 502,097

Source:
(Korea:
I, 181.

__

9,376
—

74,448

-- 155,534

381

5,571 158,787 28,366
82,437

50,191 1 4 ,6 2 4

—.—

205,815 . _ 8,711 29.405

83,216

25,948 293,823 457,047 73,276

The Bank of Korea, Annual Economic Review, 1957a
The Research Department, Bank of Korea, 1957),
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54, which presents a series of the various foreign aids
during the period 1945-1955•
Table XVIII shows that substantial economic assis
tance of over $476 million was a small amount compared with
relief aid goods of $959 million through GARIOA and CRIK.
IGA.

The operation of the Economic Cooperation

Administration in Korea was terminated in 1951, succeeded
by the Foreign Operation Administration and integrated with
the International Cooperation Administration in 1953»

Thus,

data of these programs are available only to the ICA pro
grams which are divided into project and nonproject activities.
On page 56, information shows that in project assistance
the allocation to industry and mining in 1955 was more than
three times the amount in 1954;
nearly 50 times as much.

for transportation it was

In 1954, nonproject assistance was

almost seven times over the project assistance and in the
following year project assistance was almost equal to non
project assistance.
UNKRA.

For the purpose of reunifying Korea and

reconstructing the economy, UNKRA was established*

Since

its establishment in 1950 UNKRA has contributed substantially
to the Korean economy, nevertheless the major task of rebuild
ing the economy remains to be done.

UNKRA?s contribution to

the long-run economic development in Korea during the period
from 1952 to 1955 is shown in Table XX, page 57.
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TABLE XIX
STATUS OF ICA AID AND SUPPLIES RECEIVED, 1954-1955
A.

Project Assistance

(In thousands of dollars)
Project

1954

1955

Agriculture and Natural Resources
Industry and Mining
Transportation
Health and Sanitation
Education
Social Welfare and Housing
Operating Cost

$198
6 ,3 6 7
1,305
255
—
1,570
470

$3,404
20,668
62,024
2,106
33
7,330
1,395

$10,165

$96,960

TOTAL

B.Nonproject Assistance
(In thousands of dollars)
Commodities

1953

Agricultural commodities
$3,963
Fuels
—
Raw materials and semi
finished products
1,608
Investment salable
(cement, lumber, etc.) _____ —
TOTAL
Source; The
(Korea; The
IV, 222-25«
appearing in

$5,571

1954

1955

$23,405
11,712

$28,443
10,471

30,518

54,937

6,637

15,004

$72,272

$108,855

Bank of Korea, Annual Economic Review, 1 9 5 7 .
Research Department, Bank of Korea,' 1957),
These two tables are abridged copies of those
these pages.
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TABLE IX
STATUS OF UNKRA AID AND SUPPLIES RECEIVED,

1952-1955
(In thousands of dollars)

1?52

Pro.iects
Agriculture

$—

Fishery

192

.1953

1954

$2,309

$1,375

521

IS5

462

1955

Industry

— -

349

3,501

1,664
3,921

Electric Power

__

34

757

2,293

Transport and Communications—

2,260

2,636

521

Mining

—

100

74S

2,059

Housing

—

120

1,519

2,033

3,630

1,930

2,0S9

375

577

1,245

19,504

1,11S

7,OS7

«...

1

Education

1S9

Health and Welfare

—

Commodities sustaining
Civilian Supply

—

Personal Expenditure

— —

TOTAL

__972

$3Si $2S,S66 $14,624 I 29,405

Source: The Bank of Korea, Annual Economic Review, 1957,
(Korea: The Research Department, Bank of Korea, 1957),
IV, 226-27. This is an abridged copy of that appearing
on these pages.

5S
In 1952, the UNKRA grants were not substantial, but
it should be noted that 50 percent of such grants was allo
cated to education.

Owing to the Korean War, the small

size of the aid program was influenced by UNKRATs policy
22
of "wait-and-see" before making substantial contributions.
In 1953, the proportion to industry was less than one-tenth
of that to education;

commodities sustaining civilian supply

was receiving about 70 percent of the total grants.

These

programs, however, were supplemented after 1954 by aid from
the United Nations and the United States, and the Korean
government's reconstruction efforts.
23
Other Economic Aid;

Public Law 4S0.

Public Law 1+80

was adopted July 10, 1956, as "the Agricultural Trade Devel24
opment and Assistance Act of 1954°’*
Section 2 of the Law
says that
it is hereby declared . . . to expand international
trade among the United States and friendly nations,
to facilitate the convertibility of currency, to
promote the economic stability of American agricul
ture and the national welfare, to make maximum
efficient use of surplus agricultural commodities
in furtherance of the foreign policy of the United
States, and to stimulate and facilitate the expan
sion of foreign trade in agricultural commodities

22

Lewis, John P., Reconstruction and Development in
South Korea, (Wash., D. C.s National Planning Association,
1955), p. 36.
23
United States Statutes at Large, S3 Cong., 2 Sess.,
1954, Vol. 6'S'.
24
Ibid., p. 454.
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which
. . . may be sold through private trade
channels, and foreign currencies accepted in
payment therefore.25
Fearing a serious decline in the prices of agricul
tural products., the Korean National Assembly did not at that
time favor this law as supplied to Korea, yet subsequently
the government took advantage of Public Law 1+80 and applied
for assistance.

The law allows Korea, for instance, to buy

American surplus goods in Korean currency.
Korea may benefit in two ways.
can save dollars.

This means that

One is that the government

The other is that the Korean government

may profit by buying ,at one price and selling at a higher
one, both expressed in hwan.
Agreements between Korea and the United States under
Public Law 480 were brought into existence in 1955.

As a

result of the agreement, Korea obtained commodities from the
United States (Table XXI, page 60).
D.

RECONSTRUCTION OF THE KOREAN ECONOMY

With the beginning of the original relief programs in
Korea in 1945, the U.S. government has become increasingly
interested in the reconstruction of the Korean economy.

In

1949, the long-run projects had begun with ECA programs.
But difficulties were compounded by problems of the unifica
tion question and military operations which meant that

25Ibid. . pp. 454-55o
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TABLE XXI
EXCHANGE OF UeS. AGRICULTURAL SURPLUS GOODS
TO KOREA UNDER PUBLIC LAW 480, 1955
(In thousands of dollars)
Commodities

Agreement

Raw Cotton
Its Freightage
Leaf-tobacco
Its Freightage
TOTAL

Source:
(Korea:
I, 198.

Actual Transactions

$9,400

$7,694

600

490

4,615

4 ,6 0 4

3&5

244

$15,000

$13,032

The Bank of Korea, Annual Economic Review, 1957,
The Research Department, Bank of Korea, 1957),

%
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economic programs had to give way to military priorities*
The foreign economic assistance agencies were hesitant in
their activities and, as a result, little economic recon
struction was achieved*

But, by the end of 1952, authori

ties had become aware of the need for long-run rehabilita
tion programs for the Korean economy*
The essential reconstruction programs began with the
Nathan reports on the economic situation of Korea which were
released in December, 1952*

The reports emphasized the need

for a long-run reconstruction and aid program*

In April,

1953» Henry J. Tasca, a special representative of the United
States government, made another report on the reconstruction
problems of Korea.

These reports were used in :the writing

of a document which provided a long-run reconstruction plan

26
for the Korean economy*

President Eisenhower requested

from Congress an emergency appropriation of $200 million
27
for Korean relief and rehabilitation in August 1953*
However, the Korean War ceased and the Panmunjom
truce was signed*
became brighter.

The prospects for aid and reconstruction
At the same time, American economic activi

ties in Korea became partially freed from the military*

A

veteran of the European Recovery and Mutual Security pro
grams, C. Tyler Wood, became the director of the U.N.-U.S-

uewis, o£. cit., pp. 35-37*
2^Ibid*, p. 3&*
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23
long-run projects for UNKRA and ICA in Korea.
Achievements of Projects.

Even though foreign aid

agencies have not been as successful as they might have been,
they have contributed much to rebuilding the Korean economy.
The long-run projects of UNKRA and ICA contributed
to the rebuilding of cotton mills, yarn spinning mills, and
to the construction of a new woolen plant.

Korean technicians

have been trained by the project in order to operate these
plants.

By installing 13,430 cotton spindles at Taejon in

1954, textile industries now have the capacity to meet the
domestic demands for cotton yarn.

Structural rehabilitation

of the Samchok Cement Plant was completed in 1955, thus
raising production from 60,000 metric-tons annually to
about 100,000 metric-tons.

Coal mining in the same year

increased its output by 100,000 metric-tons.

Metal mining

was also improved and the Mineral Assay Laboratory at Taejon
enlarged its facilities.

Power was increased in 1955 by

about 25 percent over 1954.

Equipment and construction

materials worth $250,000 for transportation were provided
for building railway installations and for restoring highways
and harbors.

23

Ibid.

Through the irrigation of some 90,000 acres of
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paddy land, rice output was increased by 30,000 metric29
t ons annually.
Loan funds for promoting the fishing industry were
provided by UNKRA.

Furthermore, the establishment of Cen

tral Forest Experiment Stations, housing projects, a text
book printing plant, training programs for engineers and
educators, and health service are excellent contributions
from UNKRA and ICA.
Foreign economic aid by projects in Korea is set forth
in Table XXII, page 64«

This table shows that commodities

for civilian supply amounted to $1,469 thousand, whereas
installation projects totaled only $2Sl thousand for the
years from 1945 to 1956.

That is, four-fifths of the total

foreign aid has been allocated to commodities for civilian
supply and one-fifth to installation projects.
Although Korea needed consumption goods for relief,
she needed capital equipment even more.

For one reason,

when the Japanese withdrew from the Korean peninsula, they
took much of the capital with them.

A second reason was the

destruction of the capital facilities during the Korean War.
A third reason was the adoption of a "wait-and-see" policy
by the authorities during the war.

A fourth reason was the

^ U n i t e d Nations, Report of the Agent General of the
United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency for the period
i September 1954 to 30: June 1 9 5 $ , Tenth Sess., Supplement
IS. New York, 1955 » PP*> 2-11.
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TABLE XXII
FOREIGN AID TO KOREA BY PROJECTS, 1945-1956
(In thousands of dollars)
Classification Installation Commodities for
of Funds_______ Pro.jects____ Civilian Supply
GARIOA
ECA
FOA

Total

#--

#409

#30

#379

6

170

—

26

~

.2

ICA

Others

176
26.2

187

372

5

564

UNKRA

57

32

6

95

CRIK

--

457

Public Law 4^0

--_______________ 13__________ zz______ 33

TOTAL

Source:
(Korea:
I, 182.

#280.2

#1,469

—

#11

457

$1,760.2

The Bank of Korea, Annual Economic Review. 1957.
The Research Department, Bank of Korea, 1957),
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complications that arose from the operation of aid programs
by so many different authorities<>

The ICA program, for

example, had three divided authorities which were comprised
of the State Department, the White House, and the U.S. Army.
A fifth and final reason was the poor administration of
agency operations.

For instance, under the auspices of ICA

and the Korean government foreign aid goods were disposed
through a lottery system.

The winner received the equivalent

of a million dollars for aid goods and even the losers were
sure of getting their money back.

The local currency was

valued at the official rate for the lottery system, no
matter what the real exchange value may be.

Thus, the

operation enabled a few fortunate entrepreneurs to make a
sizable profit with no risks.

A million dollars of foreign

aid was being diverted every year from constructive purposes,
and the Korean people and the agencies were losers.

Fortu30
nately, the lottery system was abolished in May of 1957.

30

Edmundson, Charles, "Don’t Make Korea Another China,”
The Reporter, October 31, 1957, pp. 31-34.

CHAPTER IV
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Since the liberation of 1945, the Korean economy has
been handicapped in three main respects;

the Japanese ex

ploitation, 1910-1945, the separation of the peninsula at
the 33th parallel, and the Korean War of 1950-1953•
The Korean postwar experience may be traced to the
provisions of the Cairo Conference in 1943 that "in due
course Korea shall become free and independent,” and the
renewal of the Cairo declaration by the Potsdam Declaration
in 1945»

To fulfill the Cairo and Potsdam promises, the

Soviet and American troops were landed in the peninsula at
the close of the Second World War.

In the meantime, an

artificial border was marked off along the 33th parallel on
the peninsula.
Since 1945, Korea’s future has become more complicated
and uncertain because of the conflict between the Soviet
Union and the United States.

The southern zone was organized

as the Republic of Korea in August, 1943.
sponsored by the United States.

This action was

The northern zone was set

up in September, 1943, as the Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea.

This action was sponsored by the Soviet Union.

No trade or communication has since taken place between the
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two zones.

What was a "convenient” demarcation line along

the 36th parallel had, by 1946, become a boundary line
separating two arbitrarily created nations.

This separation

has resulted in an effort to develop two independent econo
mies;

one is mainly agricultural and the other mainly indus

trial.
Lack of trade and communication between the two econo
mies is seriously handicapping the development of each zone.
Until the 36th parallel is abolished there can be no unified
Korea and a rational development of the economy.

The result

of separation at the 36th parallel was the Korean War of
1950-1953* resulting in damages to southern Korea alone of
1
about $1.6 billion.
The war forced Korea to allocate a
large portion of its budget for national defense.

Stemming

from the damages done and the heavy defense budget, strong
inflationary pressures have since developed. ' Thus, the
political division has been a fundamental influence in
magnifying Korea’s economic problems.

The war was one of

those minor conflicts reflecting the cold war conflict
between the great powers of the world, much as it is being
reflected by the Middle East situation today.
Under the Korean situation described above, foreign
aid was begun in 1945, and by 1955 it totaled more than

1
See page 37»
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2
$1.4 billion.

An annual average of 10 percent of the

Korean gross national product was made up of foreign aid
during the period 1945-1955.

Industries that were built

up by aid from foreign sources include textiles, minerals,
sugar, plastic, rubber, leather, paper, soap, and dyestuffs;
some of the funds were employed to restore or promote irriga
tion and fisheries.

With a favorable government economic

policy, foreign aid has greatly contributed to an increase
in the gross national product.

The national product reached

482,409 million hwan in 1953» 529,485 hwan in 1954, and
563,317 hwan in 1955«

Per capita income amounted to 23,127
3
hwan in 1953, 25,000 in 1954, and 26,169 in 1955.
Regardless of the economic progress reflected in
gross national product and per capita income, certain defi
ciencies appeared in the economy.

Most important of these

deficiencies were the following:
1.

A large percentage of the national budget was

allocated to the national defense.
Annually this allocation has reached as much as 40
4
percent.
The amount of foreign aid, it should be noted, is
5
estimated to be around 40 percent of the national budget.

2See Table XVIII, page 54.
^See Table XVI, page 4 6 .
^See Table XII, page 3 6 .
5Ibid.

69
Thus, foreign aid is equivalent to the appropriation for
national defense.
2.

Ineffective administration has failed to reach

a desirable goal for the economy.
Generally speaking, the government officers were not
trained for administrative management.

Engineers were scarce.

There was no systematically planned development program.
3.

Foreign aid to Korea was ineffective.

During the period 1945-1955, essential economic
assistance amounted to more than $476 million, and relief

6
aid amounted to

more than $959 million.

The amount desig

nated for economic assistance was inadequate to meet the need
for replenishing capital and reconstructing basic industries.
On the other hand, Korea originally was not in dire need of
relief goods but she did need capital equipment.
Koreans are now aware of a fait accompli of their
nation.

They would like to give further consideration to

possible reduction of the defense appropriation, to re
organization of an effective administration, to introduction
of an effective foreign economic aid, to checking inflation,
to reduction of imports of consumer goods and an increased
capital investment for industrialization, and the develop
ment of a self-supporting economy.

By consideration of

these problems, steps could be taken to improve the produc-

^See Table XVIII, page 54<>
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tive capacity in industry, agriculture, mining, and fish
eries*

Increased output and reduced government spendings

with effective economic assistance would lessen the infla
tionary tendencies, improve the national economy, and help
to restore economic independence, even if the economy is
less than optimal because of the fact of division.
Koreans believe that democracy is not a mere political
theory but a way of life.

Koreans believe that north and

south Korea will *'in due course” be one nation.

Koreans

would like to wait patiently for those days and to contri
bute to the making of a Family of Men.
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